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ANALYSIS OF STATUTORY RELIGIOUS
ACCOMMODATIONS FOR STATE-EMPLOYED
RELIGIOUS OBJECTORS TO SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE SOLEMNIZATION
NICHOLAS J. SCHILLING, JR.*
“Americans like to think of themselves as uncompromising. But our
true genius is our compromise. Our whole government’s founded on
it.”1
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Obergefell v. Hodges legalized
same-sex marriage. The decision aggravated a tension between advocates
of protection of religious beliefs that reject as wrong same-sex marriage and
sponsors of the new legal norm of same-sex marriage as a fundamental
right.
Prior to—and in response to—the Supreme Court’s decision in
Obergefell, at least ten state legislatures debated bills that would provide
exemptions for state officials who, on religious grounds, objected to the certification of marriage licenses for same-sex couples. Unless otherwise established by state law, officials who swear an oath to protect and defend the
Constitution must carry out the legal duties imposed by that oath—including certifying same-sex marriages. In North Carolina and Utah, these
religious exemption bills passed and are now operational. In Alabama,
Arkansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Minnesota, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
and Texas, similar such bills failed to become law through the legislative
process.
This Note proposes model legislation for states seeking to implement a
religious accommodation scheme that respects the contours of the right
articulated in the Obergefell decision. Before introducing the model statute,
the Note provides insight into several preliminary matters. First, the Note
provides background on the propriety of religious accommodations schemes
and then explores why states may seek to implement such a scheme. Moreover, the Note analyzes the accommodation schemes adopted by the state legislatures in North Carolina and Utah, and the inferred accommodation
scheme promoted by the Texas Attorney General. The treatment of these
* Student, Notre Dame Law School. Many thanks are due to the professors and
mentors (there are too many to name) who helped me think through this topic; I am
especially grateful to my Note adviser, Professor Gerard Bradley, and my religious freedom professor, Richard Garnett. A special thanks also to my papa, Richard Miller, the
man who inspired me to pursue a career in law and who always modeled faith, charity,
and service in all that he did.
1. GEOFFREY C. WARD, THE CIVIL WAR 216 (1994) (quoting Southern historian
Shelby Foote).
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issues serves as the foundation for the Note’s proposed model statutory
accommodation scheme.

INTRODUCTION
The landmark constitutional decision of Obergefell v. Hodges recognized a constitutional right to marry for same-sex couples.2 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion declared, “[t]he Court, in this decision, holds
same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all
States.”3 In many ways, the decision marked the pinnacle of the
Supreme Court’s gradual “vindication of same-sex couples’ right to
equal treatment.”4 Despite this holding, many questions still remain
regarding the interaction between the fundamental right to marriage
and other fundamental rights, such as the free exercise of religion. As
Justice Thomas lamented in his dissenting opinion, “[i]t appears all but
inevitable that [governmental and religious understandings of marriage] will come into conflict, particularly as individuals and churches
are confronted with demands to participate in and endorse civil marriages between same-sex couples.”5
The decision received enormous media attention. Many publications addressed the new marriage landscape and the place of religious
objectors in that new environment. One example, particularly poignant to the topic of this Note, was an article written by the New York Times
editorial board two weeks after the Obergefell decision. The editorial
responded to the religious resistance of state government officials to
the issuance of same-sex marriage licenses in Texas, Alabama, and Louisiana, among others. The editorial board argued that the numerous
state public officials who expressed a religious objection to certifying a
same-sex marriage should face a Hobson’s choice: the public officials
either certify such marriages contravening their religious convictions or
quit their jobs as public servants.6 Put to this choice, local elected government officials could possibly lose retirement and other benefits that
they have built up over a career if they feel “forced to exit [their position] rather than violate a religious conviction.”7 This Note will address
2. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
3. Id. at 2607.
4. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Marriage of Necessity: Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty
Protections, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161, 1166 (2014). See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
5. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2638 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
6. See Editorial, Illegal Defiance on Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/opinion/illegal-defiance-on-same-sex-marriage.ht
ml (“If doing that job violates their religious beliefs, the best solution is to find another
job.”).
7. Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation: Contraception, Abortion,
Same-Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes Between Religion and the State, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1417,
1484 (2012). Another suggestion is that individuals who oppose same-sex marriage
should not be allowed to run for office; however, such a requirement would seem to
contradict the Constitution’s prohibition under art. VI, cl. 3, which has been interpreted
to mean “that neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a
person to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.” See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S.
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a third option available to public officials like those mentioned in the
New York Times editorial.
Statutory religious accommodation8 schemes represent a viable
alternative to the Hobson’s choice advocated by some same-sex marriage proponents, such as the one voiced by the New York Times’ editorial board. This Note addresses the following issues. Part I provides a
background on the propriety of religious accommodations schemes
and the desirability of such accommodations. Part II discusses various
reasons why a state legislative accommodation scheme is desirable. Part
III introduces statutory accommodation schemes for state officials with
religious objections to same-sex marriage adopted or proposed in several states. Part III, A–B analyzes the enacted statutory schemes of
North Carolina and Utah. Then, Part III, C briefly analyzes the accommodation scheme that Texas’s Attorney General argued might be
inferred from existing statutory provisions. Finally, Part IV proposes a
model statute for future legislative enactment.9
I. JURISPRUDENCE

OR

RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS

A difficulty underlying discussions of religious accommodations is
the interaction of the two “Religion Clauses” of the First Amendment.
In the realm of accommodations, an argument that religious conduct
must be protected as a free exercise of religion may cause the government to violate the Establishment Clause by giving a special benefit to
religion. In Locke v. Davey, the Supreme Court acknowledged the tension10 between these two clauses, but reinforced the idea that “there is
room for play in the joints.”11 In other words, the Establishment Clause
may permit particular governmental actions that are not necessarily
required by the Free Exercise Clause.12 This Part briefly covers this
play in the joints between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, while also analyzing state implementations of Religious
Freedom Restoration Acts (“RFRAs”) and the Civil Rights Act’s protection of religious employees.13
488, 495 (1961). To require an individual to renounce a religious conviction contrary to
the right of same-sex married couples would seem to contravene this notion.
8. This Note adopts the definition of “accommodation” as “a special provision
exempting conduct from regulation. See MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, JOHN H. GARVEY &
THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 121 (3d ed. 2011).
9. For additional treatment of the appropriateness of some kinds of religious
exemptions in the marriage context, see generally Kent Greenwalt, Granting Exemptions from
Legal Duties: When Are They Warranted and What is the Place of Religion?, 93 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 89 (2016).
10. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973) (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971)); Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669
(1970).
11. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004).
12. Id. at 718–19.
13. The material condensed into this Part is of exceptional scope; this Note simply
provides a very basic introduction so that the discussion of particular legislative accommodation schemes is accessible to a wider audience.
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Establishment Clause Context

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in
relevant part, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion . . . .”14 The Establishment Clause, as it is popularly known,
was incorporated to the states in Everson v. Board of Education.15 The
application of this constitutional principle against the states raises a preliminary question that must be answered: can a state enact a religious
accommodation scheme without violating the Establishment Clause?
As one might imagine, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this
arena is conflicting. First, Texas Monthly v. Bullock16 invalidated a state
sales tax law that included an exception for periodicals containing religious teachings distributed by a religious faith. Despite this holding, the
Court recognized that government policies with secular objectives may
incidentally benefit religion. In fact, Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion17 states that legislative accommodations are acceptable when the
accommodations will not “impose substantial burdens on non-beneficiaries . . . or are designed to alleviate government intrusions that might
significantly deter adherents of a particular faith from conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause.”18
Nearly twenty years later, the Supreme Court upheld statutory
religious exemptions. In Cutter v. Wilkinson,19 the Court rejected the
proposition advanced by state prison officials opposing protections
granted by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”) that “the Act improperly advance[d] religion in violation
of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.” The challenged section provided that the government could not “impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person” unless the government
“demonstrate[d] that imposition of the burden on th[e] person” furthered a compelling governmental interest and utilized the least restrictive means in pursuing that interest.20 Justice Ginsburg’s majority
opinion argued that RLUIPA fit “within [the recognized] corridor
between the Religion Clauses . . . qualif[ying] as a permissible legislative
accommodation of religion that is not barred by the Establishment
Clause.”21 Justice Ginsburg further noted that RLUIPA’s accommodation scheme did not impose marked burdens on non-beneficiaries and
the Act could be neutrally administered among members of different
faiths.22
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
16. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989).
17. The Court in Texas Monthly reached a majority for the result, but divided on the
reasoning.
18. Tex. Monthly, 489 U.S. at 18 n.8.
19. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
20. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)–(2) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-114
(excluding Pub. L No. 114-92, 114-94, 114-95, and 114-113)).
21. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720.
22. Id.
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Despite the mixed results at the Supreme Court, the current doctrine of Establishment Clause jurisprudence presumes that religious
accommodations are acceptable so long as the government “acts with
the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of
religion” without seeking directly to advance or inhibit religion.23
B.

Free Exercise Clause Context

The Free Exercise Clause24 has a long history of being interpreted
to require religious accommodation.25 Although the requirement of
religious accommodation was the traditional interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause, the Supreme Court did not embrace the idea until
Sherbert v. Verner26 in 1963. In Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist was
faced with the Hobson’s choice of “choos[ing] between following the
precepts of her religion and forfeiting [unemployment] benefits, on
the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in
order to accept work, on the other hand.”27 The Court determined
that putting the religious individual in such a situation “effectively
penalize[d] the free exercise of her constitutional liberties.”28 The significant holding of the Court was that when evaluating the need for an
exemption, courts should determine whether the government imposes
a burden on a claimant’s free exercise right. If such a right is burdened, then the government must show that the regulation pursues a
compelling government interest and must show that no less restrictive
alternative means of regulation exist.29
The constitutional requirement of a free exercise exemption was
eliminated (mostly) in Employment Division v. Smith.30 Justice Scalia
penned the majority opinion, which held that neutral, generally applicable laws do not implicate the Free Exercise Clause. The Smith Court
held that “a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally
required” or that courts are the proper institution for creating such
exemptions.31 In fact, the Supreme Court encouraged legislatures to
enact accommodations through a political process of democratic governance by weighing the social importance of particular “laws against
the centrality of all religious beliefs.”32
23. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987). See generally Walz, 397 U.S. 664 (discussing that tax
exemptions neither advance nor inhibit religion).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free
exercise [of religion].”).
25. See generally MCCONNELL, supra note 8, at 122–39.
26. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
27. Id. at 404.
28. Id. at 406.
29. This framework was employed in numerous circumstances during the 1970s
and 1980s, but the “high water mark” for mandatory free exercise exemptions was Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See generally MCCONNELL, supra note 8, at 169–73.
30. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
31. Id. at 890.
32. Id.
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The Smith decision altered Sherbert’s presumption of required
accommodations and determined that religious exemptions like the
kind advocated for in this Note are not constitutionally required, but
that they are constitutionally permissible. Therefore, a state legislature’s determination that protection of the religious belief of local government officials outweighs requiring all such officials to solemnize
marriages is consistent with the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses.
C.

Response to Smith: Religious Freedom Restoration Acts

Legislatures accepted the Supreme Court’s invitation and quickly
adopted legislative responses—Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, or
RFRAs. Congress adopted RFRA with the stated purpose of restoring
Sherbert’s compelling interest and least restrictive means test. Congress’s
application of RFRA to the states via the § 5 enforcement power of the
Fourteenth Amendment was found to be unconstitutional in City of
Boerne v. Flores.33 After the federal RFRA was struck down as inapplicable to the states, eighteen states adopted RFRAs with similar language
to the federal statute, and thirteen more state courts instituted heightened protections for the free exercise of religion.34
These legislative reactions demonstrate that motivated majorities
in state legislatures may be able to pass religious accommodations of
the sort discussed in this Note. The enactments display further that
religious exemptions are an allowable exercise of state legislative
authority, notwithstanding the decision in Smith.
D.

Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act

Finally, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196435 exhibits a broader
commitment to reasonably accommodate the religious beliefs of
employees. By its clear terms, Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on an employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The Civil Rights Act’s definition of religion includes “all aspects of
religious observance and practice, as well as belief.”36 An employer can
only discriminate—or burden—an employee’s religion if “an employer
demonstrates that [it] is unable to reasonably accommodate to an
employee’s . . . religious observance . . . without undue hardship on the
conduct of the employer’s business.”37 At the very least, this prescrip33. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
34. Juliet Eilperin, 31 States Have Heightened Religious Freedom Protections, WASH. POST
(Mar. 1, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/03/01/wherein-the-u-s-are-there-heightened-protections-for-religious-freedom/. For scholarly discussion of these state RFRAs see, e.g., Symposium, Restoring Religious Freedom in the States, 32
U.C. DAVIS L. REV., 513 (1999); Gary S. Gildin, A Blessing in Disguise: Protecting Minority
Faiths Through State Religious Freedom Non-Restoration Acts, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 411
(2000).
35. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-244) (“Title VII of
The Civil Rights Act of 1964” or “Title VII”).
36. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(j) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-244).
37. Id. (emphasis added).
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tion seems to stand for an expectation that an employer will make a
reasonable attempt to accommodate an employee’s religious belief
unless such an accommodation would be unreasonable or impose an
undue hardship.38 An accommodation is required even if “the objector
does not directly facilitate the activity to which she objects.”39 Title VII
protection of religious liberty is just one example of the “various sorts”
of conscience protections “strewn about the federal legal corpus.”40
Part II shows that state governments can attempt to reasonably
accommodate their employees’ religious beliefs without imposing an
undue hardship on those seeking marriage solemnization.
II. WHY ACCOMMODATE?
This Part argues that accommodations for religious objectors in
the same-sex marriage certification process are politically and socially
desirable. First, it will explore the power of the states to regulate marriage as a general matter. Second, this Part presents a number of “secular” reasons for introducing a religious accommodation of the kind
promoted by this Note. Finally, this Part discusses the way in which
solemnizing same-sex marriage is said to contravene sincerely held
religious beliefs and introduces possible significant hardships faced by
those seeking same-sex marriage solemnization within an accommodation framework.
A.

State Authority to Accomodate

Prior to engaging a discussion of state statutory religious accommodations, it is necessary to establish that states possess the authority to
regulate marriage. Notwithstanding Obergefell’s federal judicial definition of marriage—contravening the norms allowing states to define
marriage—the states still retain the power to regulate marriage.
38. In Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), the Supreme Court narrowed this interpretation in light of the importance of collective bargaining agreements
to national labor policy. In dissent, Justice Marshall asserted, “[if] an accommodation
[under this section] can be rejected simply because it involve[d] preferential treatment,
then the regulation and the statute, while brimming with ‘sound and fury,’ ultimately
‘signif[y] nothing.’ The accommodation issue by definition arises only when a neutral
rule of general applicability conflicts with the religious practices of a particular
employee.” Id. at 87 (Marshall, J. dissenting). See MCCONNELL, supra note 8, at 281.
Another significant interpretation of Title VII came in Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), in which the Supreme Court
determined that providing accommodations for religious reasons without providing
exemptions for secular reasons was acceptable under the Act. Thus, state legislatures can
adopt religious accommodation schemes for same-sex marriage solemnization based on
religious belief without extending an accommodation to those who may oppose same-sex
marriage on philosophical, biological, or other grounds.
39. Wilson, supra note 7, at 1464–65 (emphasis added) (noting that Title VII protections extend to nurses who object to assisting with abortions, clerks with conscientious
objections to filing draft registrations at the post office, and IRS agents who refuse to
process tax-exemption applications from abortion providers).
40. GERARD V. BRADLEY, Emerging Century Challenges to Religious Liberty, in ESSAYS ON
LAW, MORALITY AND RELIGION 159, 168 (2014).
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In United States v. Windsor, the Supreme Court case that struck
down the Defense Of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion stated, “[b]y history and tradition the definition and
regulation of marriage . . . has been treated as being within the authority
and realm of the separate States.”41 Historically, and at the time of the
Founding, states regulated fully the subject of marriage and divorce
without any intervention by the federal government.42 A state’s authority to solemnize civil marriages is a foundational aspect of the state’s
sovereign authority to regulate domestic relations law.43 Therefore,
one reason that DOMA failed was that Congress exceeded its authority
by regulating an action that was within the province of the states.44 So
long as state regulation of marriage respects citizens’ constitutional
rights, the “‘regulation of domestic relations’ is ‘an area that has long
been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States.’”45
B.

Reasons for Accommodation

Therefore, while acting within the province of marriage regulation,
state legislatures adopting religious accommodations for local government officials objecting to solemnizing same-sex marriages must articulate a vision for why such accommodations are appropriate. While the
sponsors of the bills considered in this Note provide broad justifications
for their state statutes, legal scholars have pursued a theoretical discussion of reasons for accommodating. This scholarship assumed that the
redefinition of marriage would require state legislative action, which is
unnecessary in light of Obergefell, but the validity of the underlying reasons for religious accommodations in the marriage context remains.
The primary sponsors of the bills in North Carolina and Utah provided the following explanations for their introduction and support of
their respective bills. In North Carolina, Senate President Pro Tem,
Philip Berger, asserted the importance of adopting a tailored approach
41. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689–90 (2013) (emphasis added).
42. See Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 575 (1906) (“[T]he states, at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution, possessed full power over the subject of marriage and
divorce . . . . [And] the Constitution delegated no authority to the Government of the
United States on the subject of marriage and divorce.”); see also In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586,
593–94 (1890) (“The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent
and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.”).
43. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942) (“Each state as a sovereign has a rightful and legitimate concern in the marital status of persons domiciled
within its borders.”).
44. See generally Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689–93 (discussing the authority of the states
to regulate and define marriage and Congress’s lack of authority to prescribe particular
definitions of marriage by proscribing that state authority).
45. Id. at 2691 (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975)). See also Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888). Others considering the rights of government officials have considered religious liberty rights only in the
context of constitutional principles; therefore, these analyses, while useful scholarship,
are not directly applicable to the subject addressed here, in which a state provides a legislative accommodation to government officials. Cf. Vincent J. Samar, Toward a New Separation of Church and State: Implications for Analogies to the Supreme Court Decision in Hobby
Lobby by the Decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 36 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 1 (2016).
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to changing circumstances regarding marriage solemnization.46 Senator Berger framed the North Carolina statute47 as “a reasonable solution to protect the First Amendment rights of magistrates and register
of deeds employees while complying with the marriage law ordered by
the courts—so they are not forced to abandon their religious beliefs to
save their jobs.”48
Utah State Senator, Stuart Adams, echoed the sentiment of establishing policies for the regulation of marriage as consistent with state
sovereign power and in light of new definitions of marriage. While
introducing his bill49 to the Utah Senate, Senator Adams expressed his
motivations for bringing his bill to the floor: “[T]olerance, respect,
compassion, [and] equal treatment [are] the thing[s] . . . we are trying
to accomplish here, in a balanced approach.”50
The sponsors’ statements provide an insight into the general
approach adopted by state legislators supporting religious accommodations to marriage certification. By their expressions, the state legislators
are motivated not by animus, but by a concern for the balance between
religious liberty and changing attitudes towards marriage.
Prior to the Obergefell decision and the actions taken by the North
Carolina and Utah state legislatures, many legal commentators believed
that same-sex marriage would be achieved through legislative means.
As part of a proposed legislative redefinition of marriage, these commentators argued that any redefinition of marriage should be accompanied by religious accommodations—a kind of political compromise in
which opposing factions do not operate in a binary relationship.51
Despite the fact that these commentators assumed that same-sex marriage would be achieved legislatively, rather than judicially, the reasons
they promoted for wedding same-sex marriage expansions and religious
liberty accommodations remain relevant to the post-Obergefell legislative
terrain. The justifications for the provision of religious accommodations include principle, civic practicality, and political process.
1.

Principle

The principles underlying religious accommodations post-Obergefell
include “respect for liberty generally” and “respect for conscience.”52
46. J. Andrew Curliss, NC Senate Leader Berger Seeks a “Balance” on Religion, THE NEWS
& OBSERVER (Apr. 5, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-gov
ernment/politics-columns-blogs/under-the-dome/article17291543.html.
47. See infra Part III.A.
48. Editor in Family, Berger Files Bill to Protect First Amendment Rights, Jobs of N.C. Magistrates, Registers of Deeds’ Staff, N.C. POLITICAL NEWS (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.ncpoliti
calnews.com/?p=12531.
49. See infra Part III.B.
50. SB 297, 60th S., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2015) (emphasis added), http://utahlegisla
ture.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip_id=18843&meta_id=550629 (3:36:04–15).
51. See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson & Anthony Michael Kreis, Embracing Compromise:
Marriage Equality and Religious Liberty in the Political Process, 15 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 485
(2014).
52. Maggie Gallagher, Why Accommodate? Reflections on the Gay Marriage Culture Wars,
5 N.W. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y. 260, 262 (2010).
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The right to same-sex marriage hinges on the Constitution’s promise of
“liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific
rights to allow persons . . . to define and express their identity.”53 Over
seventy-five percent of Americans define or express their identity
through religious means.54 Denying the rights of a religious person to
define and express his or her identity in this way would contradict the
essential civil libertarian underpinnings of the federal recognition of a
right to marry for all two-person couples, regardless of sexual orientation. Therefore, as a means of reinforcing the liberty interest vindicated by Obergefell, citizens should seek to protect the liberty interest of
religious citizens. As Professor Robin Wilson noted, “[t]he same fundamental values of personal liberty that support an individual’s right to
live according to his or her religious convictions also support an individual’s right to follow and fulfill his or her essential identity, including
sexual identity and same-sex relationships.”55
Moreover, the principle of respect for conscience undergirds the
protection of religious expression, as well as other essential liberties,
such as the freedoms of speech, of the press, and of peaceful assembly.56 Allowing the government to subtly and gradually erode the protection of any one of these rights of conscience may jeopardize the
safety of other rights. Thomas Jefferson wrote, after serving as president, “[n]o provision in our [C]onstitution ought to be dearer to man,
than that which protects the rights of conscience against the enterprizes
[sic] of the civil authority.”57
2.

Civic Practicality

The Supreme Court’s decision did not resolve the underlying tensions between religious liberty and same-sex marriage proponents. Justice Samuel Alito warned that the Obergefell decision may be “used to
53. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593 (emphasis added).
54. Religious Landscape Study, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (last visited Feb. 7, 2016),
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/.
55. Wilson, supra note 4, at 1176. See generally id. at 1176 n.59. Professor Douglas
Laycock echoes the similarity between sexual and religious minorities arguing that “[i]n
resisting legal and social pressures to conform to majoritarian norms, [sexual and religious minorities] make essentially parallel and mutually reinforcing claims against the
larger society. They claim that some aspects of human identity are so fundamental that
they should be left to each individual, free of all nonessential regulation, even when manifested in conduct. No human being should be penalized because of her religious practice, or because of her choice of sexual partners, unless her conduct is actually inflicting
significant and cognizable harm on some other person.” See Douglas Laycock, Afterword,
in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 189, 189 (Douglas
Laycock et al. eds., 2008). See also EMILY R. GILL, AN ARGUMENT FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE:
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, SEXUAL FREEDOM, AND PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS OF CIVIC EQUALITY 44
(2012) (“[S]exual orientation, like religious belief, is a central facet or constituent of
personal identity . . . .”).
56. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
57. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, President of the United States, to Richard Douglas, Member of the Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church at New London, Connecticut, (Feb. 4, 1809), available at: FOUNDERS ONLINE, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, http://
founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-9714 (last updated Dec. 30, 2015).
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vilify Americans who are unwilling to assent to the new orthodoxy
[namely, religious objectors to same-sex marriage] . . . . By imposing its
own views on the entire country, the majority facilitates the marginalization of the many Americans who have traditional ideas.”58 Religious
accommodation would help to “allay concerns” of those who oppose
same-sex marriage, while not limiting the recognition of same-sex
marriages.59
In many jurisdictions that adopted same-sex marriage prior to the
Obergefell decision, “religious liberty protections for religious objectors
who adhere[d] to a heterosexual view of marriage—exempting [the
objectors] from requirements to facilitate” same-sex marriages was
essential to the legislation’s success.60 In fact, the New York Times recognized the centrality of this compromise in the success of same-sex marriage legislation in New York,
[expansive religious liberty protections] proved to be the most
microscopically examined and debated—and the most pivotal—in
the battle over same-sex marriage. Language that Republican senators inserted into the bill legalizing same-sex marriage provided
more expansive protections . . . and helped pull the legislation
over the finish line . . . .61

The tolerance demonstrated by an accommodation scheme is
arguably necessary to maintaining the fabric of civic society.62 An
appropriate religious accommodation framework would avoid the typical cycle of the culture war dynamic between sexual minority and religious liberty seekers, which tends to progress in the following manner:
Securing important ground more often leads to new and escalated
demands and to more aggressive efforts against remaining pockets
of resistance . . . [it] seems safe to assume . . . that legal recognition of same-sex marriage would lead to further efforts to secure
affirmative support from both the public and private sectors and
the elimination or narrow confinement of any right to conscientious objection to the new regime.63

This tolerance involves an element of moral sympathy in which the
political winners acknowledge the importance of vibrant social discussion and show a concern for those who have lost in the political
arena.64 In essence, the question after Obergefell is “whether champions
58. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2642–43 (Alito, J., dissenting).
59. Gallagher, supra note 52, at 260.
60. Wilson, supra note 4, at 1168.
61. Danny Hakim, Exemptions Were Key to Vote on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (June 25,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/26/nyregion/religious-exemptions-were-keyto-new-york-gay-marriage-vote.html?_r=0.
62. For an extended treatment of feasible accommodation in a pluralistic society,
see WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL
STATE 295 (1991) (arguing that the state should accommodate religious belief and practice as much as possible limited only by the needs of social cohesion).
63. Laycock, supra note 55, at 194.
64. See WILLIAM STACY JOHNSON, A TIME TO EMBRACE: SAME-GENDER RELATIONSHIPS
IN RELIGION, LAW, AND POLITICS, 192–93 (2006) (“Commitment to equality and liberty
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of tolerance are prepared to tolerate proponents of a different ethical
vision.”65 Cases in which courts impose legal penalties and civil liabilities upon religious objectors to same-sex marriage “will further inflame
the opponents of same-sex marriage . . . empower[ing] the most demagogic opponents of same-sex marriage.”66 The creation of religious
martyrs of this kind will, more likely than not, “delay social acceptance
of gay marriages, [and] not [ ] hasten it.”67 Therefore, as proponents
of same-sex marriage continue to seek the acceptance of same-sex married couples, it would be in the movement’s best self-interest to accept
religious accommodations as means of gathering support from citizens
concerned about religious liberty.
3.

Political Process

Finally, many opponents of same-sex marriage argued that legislation presented the appropriate method of redefining marriage. State
legislative enactments of religious accommodations in the solemnization of same-sex marriage may reflect local preferences and reclaim the
importance of legislative action in the marriage context.
Even for those who do not support same-sex marriage, state legislative enactments of a broader definition were preferable to judicial decisions because the judicial proclamations are “fraught with risk for
religious dissenters precisely because it leaves no meaningful opportunity for balancing competing goods, namely, marriage equality with
religious liberty. Six of the seven states recognizing same-sex marriage
by judicial decision [as of January 14, 2014] gave no new protections to
religious objectors.”68
Dissenting opinions in Obergefell reflected the preference for legislative action regarding marriage. Chief Justice Roberts recognized that
Mr. Obergefell, and those bringing challenges to state laws with him,
made “strong arguments rooted in social policy and considerations of
fairness” but the “[Supreme] Court is not a legislature. Whether samesex marriage is a good idea should be of no concern to us.”69 Justice
Thomas echoed the Chief Justice’s discomfort with judicial definition
of marriage stating, “[h]ad the majority allowed the definition of marriage to be left to the political process—as the Constitution requires—
the People could have considered the religious liberty implications of
deviating from the traditional definition [of marriage] as part of their
deliberative process.”70
requires that we be especially zealous to protect groups that happen to be unpopular.”).
Although William Johnson was referencing sexual minorities, in the post-Obergefell climate, his sentiments may fairly be attributed to the traditional, religious majority.
65. Marc D. Stern, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 1, 57 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008).
66. Wilson, supra note 7, at 1433–34 (quoting a letter from Professor Douglas Laycock to Professor Wilson).
67. Id. at 1434.
68. Wilson, supra note 4, at 1173.
69. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 2639 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Legislative accommodations—or, at the very least, discussions of
such accommodations—bring the social conversation of these competing goods of same-sex marriage and religious liberty back into the
realm of representative politics. Encouraging this kind of state lawmaking “allows [for] local policies ‘more sensitive to the diverse needs of a
heterogeneous society,’ permits ‘innovation and experimentation,’
enables greater citizen ‘involvement in democratic processes,’ and
makes government ‘more responsive by putting States in competition
for a mobile citizenry.’”71 Suggested accommodations may present a
marriage of both access to government solemnization and religious
freedom in order to avoid zero-sum propositions in the political arena.
C.

Rights of Conscientious Objectors and Significant Hardships

State legislative accommodations for state-employed religious
objectors to same-sex marriage solemnization should try to make a sensible balance between the protection of “the right of conscientious
objectors to refuse to facilitate same-sex marriages, except where such a
refusal imposes significant hardship on the same-sex couple.”72 In this
scenario, moral integrity of the government official trumps the inconvenience of receiving service from a different, nearby provider.
Justification for an accommodation arises when a sincerely held
religious belief is implicated by some compelled act. In this regard,
religious objectors to same-sex marriage solemnization argue that,
while they are not directly facilitating sinful activity, certifying a samesex couple’s marriage implicates moral complicity.73 The question concerns “the circumstances under which it is wrong for a person to perform an act that is innocent in itself but that has the effect of enabling
or facilitating the commission of an immoral act by another.”74 “[W]ith
other actions, ideas of complicity and vicarious moral responsibility
have not seemed so far-fetched. They underpinned, for example, boycotts of companies doing business in South Africa during apartheid.”75
The argument of moral complicity parallels ideas of criminal complicity. To be criminally complicit, an individual “need only facilitate
the [criminal] scheme to some (even slight) degree with knowledge of
the scheme’s intended result.”76 The Supreme Court recently reinforced this notion of complicity stating that criminal law “reflects a centuries-old view of culpability: that a person may be responsible for a
71. Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
72. Laycock, supra note 55, at 198.
73. See generally Wilson, supra note 7, at 1462 (arguing that state legislative exemptions in the marriage context clearly recognized “claims of facilitation as worthy of
respect”).
74. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014).
75. Wilson, supra note 7, at 1462.
76. Brief of Former Justice Department Officials Supporting Petitioners at 4, Zubik
v. Burwell, 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (No. 14-1418)
[hereinafter “Brief of Former Justice Department Officials”], http://www.scotusblog.com
/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Former-Justice-Department-Officials-LSP-Amicus.pdf.
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crime he has not personally carried out if he helps another to complete
its commission.”77
The parallel between moral and criminal complicity contains a scienter requirement that the aider or abettor possess knowledge that he
or she is helping to facilitate an illicit act. In the context of same-sex
marriage, no local government official is directly engaging in an act
that his or her religion would hold to be sinful. However, those government officials “have advance knowledge” that their actions “will result
in conduct that, to them, is deeply immoral.”78
The final remaining piece for the facilitation of sinfulness is the
existence of a sincerely held religious belief implicated by same-sex
marriage. This is presumptively the case, but it is still important to
understand why religious objectors “feel that they are being asked to
promote or facilitate sin in a way that makes them personally responsible for the sin that ensues.”79 As the largest religious belief system in
the United States, Christianity serves as a useful example.80 Many
Christian religious groups oppose homosexuality or homosexual conduct in some way. These Christians regard acting on same-sex attraction as a sinful choice . . . . [For example, the Catholic Church]
acknowledged that because same-sex attraction is an innate predisposition or unchosen condition, it cannot be a sin . . . . [N]evertheless, the
tendency toward a morally evil practice is itself an ‘objective disorder.’81
If an accommodation scheme is enacted by a state legislature, one
must consider whether same-sex couples wanting to marry will suffer a
significant hardship. Challenges to religious accommodations for government officials objecting to solemnizing same-sex marriages will likely
argue that such schemes send “a deliberate, purposeful and malicious
message to gays and lesbians that they are not full citizens.”82 The
harm complained of here is a dignitary harm, which inflicts an injury
on a person’s reputation or honor. Although the existence of an
accommodation may be offensive, it would likely fail to rise to the level
of a justiciable injury. Therefore, a dignitary harm that is justiciable will
likely arise from an actual denial of service. For example, a dignitary
harm would be caused if a same-sex couple arrived at the county clerk’s
office and requested a solemnization of their marriage, but no member
of the office was willing to perform such a service. This would obviously
be a problem and would impose a significant hardship on a same-sex
77. Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1245 (2014).
78. Brief of Former Justice Department Officials, supra note 76, at 10. It would be
an inappropriate inquiry for a court to analyze whether even such a slight facilitation of
immoral conduct is sinful because that would border on adjudging the tenets of a religion. See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (“Judging the centrality
of different religious practices is akin to the unacceptable business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims.”) (internal citations omitted).
79. Laycock, supra note 55, at 195.
80. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 54 (displaying that 70.6% of Americans identify as Christians).
81. Gill, supra note 55, at 163.
82. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 14, Ansley v. North Carolina, No. 1:15cv-274 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 9, 2015).
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couple. A less clear scenario is one in which the person at the counter,
who objects on religious grounds to solemnization, redirects the couple
to another member of the office who does not have such objections.
Would such a transfer, with minimal delay, impose a significant burden?83 A properly tailored religious accommodation scheme can avoid
such a danger and ensure that same-sex marriages are couples have the
marriages solemnized.
While same-sex couples will almost certainly argue that such a dignitary harm exists in all circumstances, many arguments fail to recognize that there are two potential dignitary harms at play: “the possible
affront to lesbian and gay couples who are turned aside, and the affront
to religious believers who are told that their beliefs are not to be tolerated, at least not in the public sphere.”84 State statutes accommodating
conscientious objectors should try to balance these interests because
“appropriately crafted exemptions need not ask same-sex couples to
bear the cost of protecting others’ religious beliefs. The protections for
individual objectors . . . have proposed to seek to balance two competing concerns—marriage equality and religious liberty.”85
III. STATE STATUTORY SCHEMES
Prior to the Obergefell decision, two state legislatures adopted
accommodations for state government officials who opposed performing same-sex marriage ceremonies because of religious objections.86
These accommodations provide an insight into what a statutory accommodation for religious individuals could look like in the context of
same-sex marriage. There are three characteristics of the statutory language that, if analyzed separate of one another, will enhance the review
of these statutory schemes. The first characteristic is the allowable reasons for and scope of recusal. The second feature is the protected class
of government officials to whom the accommodation extends. The
third consideration is the mechanisms in place to assure the speedy
administration of marriage requests.
83. Laycock, supra note 55, at 198 (Professor Laycock argues that in this scenario,
the same-sex couple has not suffered a significant hardship but faces a larger problem, an
insult that reminds them “that some [of their] fellow citizens vehemently disapprove of
what they are doing . . . . Hurt feelings or personal offense are so far not a basis for
censorship of ideas in American law.”).
84. Wilson, supra note 7, at 1505.
85. Id. at 1479.
86. In Louisiana, Governor Bobby Jindal issued an Executive Order on May 19,
2015 that protected religious individuals and institutions from adverse action by the state
because of their definition or understanding of marriage. Governor Jindal’s action is
notable as an example of the concerns highlighted by Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion about the tension between religious and governmental definitions of marriage. However, because the law was accomplished through an executive order, and because the
order does not address directly government officials seeking recusal from same-sex marriage ceremonies for religious reasons, Governor Jindal’s action is beyond the scope of
this Note. See Exec. Order No. BJ 15-8 (2015).
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North Carolina’s Adopted Statute87

The North Carolina statute (N.C. S. 2) was passed under the title,
“An Act to Allow Magistrates, Assistant Registers of Deeds, and Deputy
Registers of Deeds to Recuse Themselves From Performing Duties
Related to Marriage Ceremonies Due to Sincerely Held Religious
Objection.”88 The bill passed through the North Carolina House and
Senate, but was vetoed by Governor Pat McCrory on May 28, 2015.89
Then, on June 1, the Senate overrode the veto by a vote of 32–16,90 and
on June 11, the House overrode the veto by a vote of 69–41,91 and the
act became law.
In North Carolina, the requisites of a valid and sufficient marriage
solemnization are the following: “[T]he consent of [two adults],” who
consent to marriage “freely, seriously, and plainly expressed by each” in
the presence of a witness, and that witness be either an ordained minister or a magistrate.92 The final requirement—that of the presence of a
magistrate in the absence of an ordained minister—is statutorily
defined as a collective duty, and not one imposed upon a single, individual magistrate.93
1.

Recusal Components

Under N.C. S. 2, the designated officials possess “the right to
recuse from performing all lawful marriages . . . based upon any sincerely
held religious objection.”94 The North Carolina scheme allows government officials to recuse themselves for any sincerely held religious
objection. Because of the difficulty and dangers posed by adjudicating
the sincerity—or legitimacy—of a religious objection, very few stated
religious objections would be challenged. However, the statute provides protection from conviction or disciplinary action so long as the
government official in question pursues “a good-faith recusal” in accordance with the requirements of the statute.95 This provision means
87. The North Carolina statute’s return provisions are beyond the scope of this
Note. Under these provisions, magistrates that resigned after the Obergefell decision, but
prior to the adoption of the bill, were reassigned to their positions.
88. 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws 75 [hereinafter N.C. Statute], http://www.ncleg.net/
Applications/BillLookUp/LoadBillDocument.aspx?SessionCode=2015&DocNum=16&
SeqNum=0.
89. Governor McCrory’s Veto of the Legislation (N.C. May 28, 2015), http://
www.ncleg.net/Applications/BillLookUp/LoadBillDocument.aspx?SessionCode=2015&
DocNum=5074&SeqNum=0.
90. N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, Record of the Senate Vote, June 1, 2015, 7:59PM, http://www.
ncleg.net/gascripts/voteHistory/RollCallVoteTranscript.pl?sSession=2015&sChamber=S
&RCS=346.
91. N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, Record of the House Vote, June 11, 2015, 10:10AM, http://
www.ncleg.net/gascripts/voteHistory/RollCallVoteTranscript.pl?sSession=2015&sCham
ber=H&RCS=721.
92. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1 (2012) (The bracketed language replaces the statute’s
designation of a “man and woman” in order to reflect the changed marriage requirements enshrined in the Supreme Court’s Obergefell opinion.).
93. See N.C. Statute, supra note 88, at § 7A-292(b).
94. Id. at § 51-5.5(a) & (b) (emphasis added).
95. Id. at § 51-5.5(d).
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that government officials may be criminally or disciplinarily liable for
failing to solemnize a marriage if the government officials either (a)
recuse themselves in bad faith—the absence of good faith—or (b) do
not recuse themselves but still maintain a religious objection to solemnizing marriages contrary to their religious beliefs.
The requirement that the government official forego the solemnization of all marriages, not just the marriages to which he or she possesses a religious objection, is a further noteworthy element of the
recusal provisions. In practice, this means that no same-sex couple
would be discriminated against by virtue of the couple’s composition;
rather, the recusal requires a blanket prohibition of the government
official’s participation in any marriage.
2.

Protected Class of Government Officials

The North Carolina scheme extends to every “magistrate,” “assistant register of deeds,” and “deputy register of deeds.” Eligible government officials may recuse themselves in the following ways. A
magistrate may initiate recusal upon “notice to the chief district court
judge.”96 Assistant registers of deeds and deputy registers of deeds may
recuse themselves from marriage solemnization by providing notice to
the register of deeds.97 Any of these government officials may rescind
his or her recusal by writing to the official to whom they must provide
notice of such recusal.
3.

Alternative Mechanism for Solemnization

Regardless of the position of the government official seeking
recusal, state officials are required to ensure that marriage licenses will
be issued.98 If magistrates who have not recused themselves are available, the chief district court judge “shall ensure that marriages before a
magistrate are available to be performed at least a total of 10 hours per
week, over at least three business days per week.”99 If, however, all magistrates in a particular jurisdiction recuse themselves under the accommodation scheme, the chief district court judge shall ensure this
availability by notifying the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC).
The AOC shall make magistrates “available in that jurisdiction for performance of marriages for the times required [by the statute].”100 In
96. Id.
97. In North Carolina, the register of deeds is an elected official. See, e.g., Register of
Deeds, MECKLENBURG COUNTY NC, http://charmeck.org/mecklenburg/county/ROD/
Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 2015); Biography of Register of Deeds, GUILFORD
COUNTY, http://www.myguilford.com/rod/biography-of-register-of-deeds/ (last visited
Feb. 3, 2015). The register’s office serves a number of record-keeping services. Most
relevant for the purposes of this Note is the office’s authority to issue marriage licenses.
See N.C. Statute, supra note 88, at § 7A-292(a)(9).
98. N.C. Statute, supra note 85, at § 51-5.5(a) & (b) (“The chief district court judge
shall ensure that all individuals issued a marriage license seeking to be married before a
magistrate may marry.”) (“The Register of Deeds shall ensure for all applicants for marriage licenses to be issued a license upon satisfaction of the [state’s] requirements.”).
99. Id. at § 7A-292(b).
100. Id. at § 51-5.5(c).
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the circumstance that the AOC’s designation of a magistrate is not
immediate, the chief district court judge will either assume the marriage designation functions of a magistrate or shall designate another
district court judge to serve in that capacity.
B.

Utah’s Adopted Statute

Unlike the North Carolina statute, Utah’s religious protection law
breezed through the legislative process. Governor Gary Herbert signed
the Act, entitled “Protections for Religious Expression and Beliefs
about Marriage, Family, or Sexuality,”101 into law on March 20, 2015.102
The governor placed his signature on the legislation after the bill
passed unanimously through the Senate Business and Labor and the
House Judiciary Committees. The bill found similar support in both
chambers of the state legislature, passing the Senate by a vote of 24–5
on March 9, 2015 and the House by a vote of 66–9 on March 11,
2015.103 The statute is most notable for the sweeping breadth of discretion that it imbues in local government officials.
In Utah, two individuals over the age of eighteen may be married if
two adult witnesses are present and the solemnization of the marriage is
performed by any variety of religious minister or government
official.104
1.

Recusal Components

Utah’s statute does not provide explicit recusal processes or for
allowable reasons for recusal. Rather, the statute provides a significant
amount of local autonomy. A county clerk must simply establish a policy to ensure that legal marriages can be solemnized during business
hours when one is sought. This open policy allows for any number of
government officials to recuse themselves from solemnizing marriages—or only from marriages with which they disagree—for any reason, so long as another government official is available to provide the
certification service.
A government official who takes advantage of a recusal practice
established by a county clerk is protected from “government retaliation” if the government official is exercising the protection provided by
Utah Law 1953 § 17-20-4. The statute’s provisions clearly create a
framework in which a county clerk who recuses his or herself from solemnizing particular marriages is protected from prosecution by any
government entity. Reinforcing the protective nature of the statute’s
language is the bill’s requirement that the statutory text be construed
101. 2015 Utah Laws 297 [hereinafter Utah Statute], http://le.utah.gov/~2015/
bills/static/sb0297.html.
102. Utah Senate Bill 297 amended, in relevant part, the following sections: UTAH
CODE ANN. 1953 § 17-20-4 and § 30-1-6 (West 2015). Furthermore, the bill enacted the
following relevant sections: UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 63G-20-103, and § 63G-20-202 (West
2015).
103. Bill voting records, http://le.utah.gov/~2015/bills/static/SB0297.html.
104. UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 30-1-6 (West 2015) (listing the eligible religious ministers and the eleven allowable government officials).
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“in favor of a broad protection of religious beliefs, exercises, and conscience to the maximum extent permitted” within constitutional
limits.105
2.

Protected Class of Government Officials

The Utah Statute does not expressly limit itself to the protection of
county clerks, but from the text and structure of the legislation, it may
be inferred that the statutory recusal protection extends only to county
clerks.106 Utah Law 1953 § 17-20-4 requires the county clerk to establish policies for the issuance of marriage licenses and for the availability
of a government official to solemnize such marriages.107 If a county
clerk recuses his or herself, the county clerk must designate a willing
individual who would be available to issue marriage licenses during normal business hours. The statute does not provide guidance for who
qualifies to be the county clerk’s designee or the procedures by which
the county clerk must select such a designee. Furthermore, the statute
fails to provide a process by which the county clerk would make known
his or her recusal.
3.

Alternative Mechanisms for Solemnization

Finally, the statute does not envision a need for alternative mechanisms for solemnization because the county clerk’s statutory responsibility is to ensure the “solemniz[ation] [of] a legal marriage for which a
marriage license has been issued . . . .”108 That said, the state of Utah
allows a number of individuals to solemnize a marriage including: ministers, rabbis, or priests of any religious denomination maintaining certain qualifications; the governor or lieutenant governor; mayors or
county executives; a justice, judge, or commissioner of a state court; or
a United States judge or magistrate inter alia.109 In an effort to presumably facilitate a smooth solemnization process, counties in Utah have
provided a list of eligible and available officials that may solemnize a
marriage outside of the county clerk.110
C.

Texas’s Accommodation by Inference

Unlike the schemes adopted in North Carolina and Utah, Texas’s
asserted accommodation scheme was inferred from preexisting statutory requirements and a base assumption that individuals have the freedom to exercise their religion, even in government positions. Because
Texas’s accommodation was not enacted by new legislation—or by
105. Id. at § 63G-20-103.
106. County clerks are elected officials. See County Clerks, ELECTIONS.UTAH.GOV (last
visited Feb. 3, 2015), http://elections.utah.gov/election-resources/county-clerks.
107. UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 17-20-4(2) (West 2015).
108. Id.
109. UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 30-1-6(1)(a)-(l) (West 2015).
110. See, e.g., County Clerks, supra note 106; Marriage Officiants, DAVISCOUNTYUTAH.GOV (last visited Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.daviscountyutah.gov/docs/librariespro
vider11/default-document-library/list-of-available-marriage-officiants38832d4f13296568a
4f7ff3c0015e574.pdf?sfvrsn=0.
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amendment of preexisting statutes—the scheme is slightly anomalous
for this Note, but is still worth discussing as an example of state behavior in the same-sex marriage realm.
Immediately following the Obergefell decision, county clerks and
magistrates in Texas refused to provide certification services to samesex couples because of religious objections to performing such acts.111
The Texas Attorney General, Ken Paxton, submitted to the government
officials’ objections in order to “protect the religious liberties of hundreds of local officials whose job it is [to] issue marriage licenses.”112 In
a statement, Attorney General Paxton stated, “[in Obergefell], the
Supreme Court did not diminish, overrule, or call into question the
First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion . . . [the] federal
constitutional right to same-sex marriage should peaceably coexist
alongside longstanding constitutional and statutory rights . . . .”113
Attorney General Paxton concluded that the county clerks and
their employees’ religious freedoms allowed for an exemption from
issuing same-sex marriage licenses. This conclusion rested upon an
interpretation of state law governing the issuance of marriage licenses.
Statutorily, county clerks could delegate any of their official responsibilities to others.114 Because of this ability to delegate authority, Attorney
General Paxton opined that a county clerk could delegate same-sex
marriage licensing responsibilities to deputy clerks. He also argued
that these local officials had discretion to perform such functions.115
Effectively, Ken Paxton maintained that the statute’s allowance for delegation of functions impliedly allows the clerks to delegate work to their
deputies for any reason under any circumstance, especially to protect
the exercise of their religion in scenarios requiring the solemnization
of same-sex marriages. The question remains, however, of whether
Texas needed to explicitly adopt a recusal scheme for religious
accommodations.
IV. MODEL STATUTORY SCHEME
This Part articulates a scheme that ensures a balance between the
solemnization of legal same-sex marriages and the protection of the
111. See generally Philip Bump, Can a Texas County Clerk Refuse to Issue a Gay Marriage
License? It’s Complicated., WASH. POST (June 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-fix/wp/2015/06/29/can-a-texas-county-clerk-refuse-to-issue-a-gay-marriage-li
cense-its-complicated/; see also Sandhya Somashekhar, Texas AG: County Workers Don’t Have
to Issue Same-Sex Marriage Licenses, WASH. POST (June 28, 2015), https://www.washington
post.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/06/28/texas-ag-county-workers-can-opt-out-ofsame-sex-marriage/.
112. Somashekhar, supra note 111.
113. Texas Attorney Gen. Ken Paxton, Statement (June 28, 2015), https://www.tex
asattorneygeneral.gov/static/5144.html.
114. TEX. LOC. GOV’T. CODE ANN. § 82.005(c) (West 2008) (“A deputy clerk acts in
the name of the county clerk and may perform all official acts that the county clerk may perform.”) (emphasis added).
115. Texas Attorney General Paxton Opinion Letter to Texas Lieutenant Governor
Dan Patrick (June 28, 2015), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/opinions/
51paxton/op/2015/kp0025.pdf.
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religious beliefs of individual government officials by drawing upon the
strengths and weaknesses of the North Carolina and Utah statutes.116
A.

Recusal Components

First, provision of a process for recusal must be made. The rigidity
of the recusal process in the North Carolina statute avoids the
unwanted surprise that may result from Utah’s localized discretionary
recusal scheme. A proper recusal scheme will allow the specified government official to register his or her objection with the Administrative
Office of the Courts. The public recusal process will allow voters to
operate with full information regarding potential candidates in those
counties where officials responsible for solemnizing marriages are
elected. In order to qualify for registration, the government officials
must complete the following tasks: (1) maintain a sincerely held religious objection to the solemnization of same-sex marriages and (2) verify
that a member of his or her office will be available to solemnize any
marriages—regardless of the sexual orientation of the couple.
The limitation of the exemption to only objections based on a sincerely held religious belief vindicates the free exercise rights of religious individuals and can be applied neutrally among believers of
different faiths. While there may be concerns about whether the
exemption should extend to those who object to solemnizing same-sex
marriage on philosophical or other non-religious grounds, only a religious accommodation scheme can fit nicely in the “play in the joints”
between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses as reaffirmed by
the Supreme Court in Cutter.117
The second prong of the recusal process will ensure that non-beneficiaries of the accommodation do not suffer an increased hardship by
requiring the government official, prior to publicly recusing him or
herself, to ensure that a replacement is available from the office. If no
such member of the office exists, the government official in charge of
the office has the responsibility to ensure that his or her absence is
remedied prior to registering his or her recusal with the Administrative
Office of the Courts. In this way, a government official can refuse to
solemnize a marriage “only if another government official is promptly
available and willing to do so without inconvenience . . . .”118 Therefore, religious liberty would yield in the face of an unavoidable conflict
with marriage equality thus ensuring that no “state official may ever act
as a chokepoint on the path to marriage.”119
116. For an example of a more general religious accommodation scheme, see Letter
to Minnesota State Legislature Representatives from Constitutional Law Professors, at
10–11, http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/mn-main-letter-pdf-1.pdf.
117. In dealing with this difficulty, Professor Michael McConnell contends, “[t]he
unifying principle is that the religious life of the people should be insulated, to the maximum possible degree, from the effect of governmental action, whether favorable or unfavorable. To extend this principle to all other beliefs and activities[,] [i.e., non-religious
reasons] would be impossible.” See McConnell, supra note 8, at 121.
118. Wilson, supra note 7, at 1480.
119. Id.
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Protected Class of Government Officials

The technical terms for the appropriate government official varies
from state to state, but the protected class of government officials will
include county clerks (or a state’s equivalent, e.g., “Justice of the
Peace”) and the clerks’ deputies. This will provide accommodation coverage to government officials lower than judicial actors involved with
the marriage process. If a county clerk chooses not to recuse herself,
that does not prevent a deputy clerk from recusing himself. However, if
a county clerk and her deputy clerks all decide to recuse themselves,
then the county clerk must, consistent with the second prong of the
statute, make provisions for a qualified individual to be available in the
office to solemnize marriages. While it may be said that one of the
county clerk’s duties is to solemnize marriages, there is no evidence
that a particular county clerk “or other official authorized to officiate is
under a statutory duty to perform marriages when requested, and [it is
likely] that no such specific duty exists.”120 The limitation of the
recusal accommodation to county clerks—or a particular state’s
equivalent—and to deputy clerks will help to facilitate the alternative
mechanisms for solemnization.
C.

Alternative Mechanisms for Solemnization

The scope of recusal should extend to all marriages—as in North
Carolina—rather than from only those marriages to which the government official has a religious objection. By this standard, a homosexual
couple and a heterosexual couple would receive the same treatment by
the recusing government official, namely, the introduction of the other
office employee who is designated to solemnize marriages. Recusing
oneself from all marriages avoids the unequal application of solemnization by a government official based on the couples’ sexual orientation.
Moreover, to ensure that no couple is turned away because of the
absence of a solemnizing official, the clerk’s office should establish
timeframes during which marriage licenses may be solemnized. This
procedure would provide additional assurance that marriages could be
solemnized conveniently and without delay. Such a practice could
reflect the explicit requirements established in the North Carolina
statute.121
Furthermore, the state may—and should—provide alternative
mechanisms for solemnization beyond the clerk’s office. Other government officials may be authorized by the state to solemnize marriages.
This authorization will increase the likelihood that couples seeking
120. Id. at 1471 n.209 (referencing Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 274, 294 (2010)); see id. at 1474 (“[T]he
claim that government employees must perform all services offered by a government
office conflates the public’s legitimate claim to receive the service from the state with a
claimed entitlement to receive it from each employee of the office.”).
121. See N.C. Statute, supra note 88, at § 7A-292(b) (explaining if magistrates who
have not recused themselves are available, the chief district court judge “shall ensure that
marriages before a magistrate are available to be performed at least a total of 10 hours per
week, over at least three business days per week”).
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marriage solemnization will be able to find a government official
nearby who is available to perform the government service. This type of
authorization may reflect the scheme in Utah in which religious ministers; the governor, or lieutenant governor; mayors or county executives;
a justice, judge, or commissioner of a state court; or judge of a United
States judge or magistrate inter alia is sanctioned to certify marriages.122
County clerks can further facilitate a smooth solemnization process by
providing a list of eligible officials outside the county clerk’s office and
their availability to solemnize a marriage.123
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court’s Obergefell v. Hodges decision decided the significant question of whether states are constitutionally required to allow
marriages between same-sex couples. Despite this determination, many
questions abound regarding the interaction between the newly recognized fundamental right to marry for all consenting, adult couples and
religious liberty. While the federal definition of marriage will prevail,
the states still retain sovereign authority over the regulation of marriage. Therefore, states should institute religious accommodations for
government officials with sincerely held religious beliefs contradictory
to the Obergefell definition of marriage. Accommodations of this kind
are motivated by principles of liberty embodied in the Supreme Court’s
treatment of religious liberty and marriage rights, the practical implications of the tension between religion and same-sex marriage in the civic
arena, and a commitment to proper procedural practice in the realm of
religious protections and marriage recognition.
States seeking to pass an accommodation scheme should focus on
explicit recusal practices that carefully detail the reasons for allowable
recusal, the process by which a recusal is identified, and the steps that
must be taken by the relevant government officials once a recusal is
initiated. A recusal of this kind should be from all marriages, not just
from the marriages that the government official finds objectionable.
Furthermore, the statutes should identify clearly a limited class of government officials who may qualify for the accommodation. Finally,
states may identify other individuals who are capacitated to solemnize a
marriage. A religious accommodation scheme done well can permit
conscientious refusals while maintaining access to marriage; in this way,
protections for conscience do not arise at the expense of access to
marriage.

122. UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 30-1-6(1)(a)-(l) (West 2015).
123. See, e.g., County Clerks, supra note 106.
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